Knight-Ridder / Tribune Business & Market News
Tuesday, December 9, 2003
Byline: The Charlotte Observer, N.C.
Source: Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News
Airline Trends Worry Mechanics
(Partial article)

Mechanics often work long days. The mechanic in Huntington , W.Va. , who adjusted control cables on a Beech 1900D two days before the plane crashed in Charlotte worked a 14-hour shift, according to time cards made public by the NTSB. His trainer, who also inspected the job, worked a 15.5-hour shift.

Experts recommend that mechanics not work shifts longer than 13 hours, including overtime, in order to prevent fatigue.

With technology, need for training rises, but budgets fall. In some ways, the jobs of airline mechanics will likely grow harder.

Modern aircraft are more reliable, experts say, but the maintenance they require involves more technical expertise. That, experts say, is one reason to improve training.

But at some airlines, budget cutbacks have reduced training.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, US Airways has cut back on a "human factors" training program. Such training seeks to create a work environment where maintenance mistakes are less likely to happen -- by encouraging teamwork and recognizing how personal problems may impede performance.

US Airways says that human factors training for new mechanics, once offered in separate sessions of about six hours, has been folded into the hour-and-a-half session offered as recurrent training to veteran mechanics. The airline said the FAA does not require it to offer any human factors training to mechanics.

The airline says its training for mechanics remains thorough.

"We've kept the same rigid training and qualification standards we've always had," says Bozin, the US Airways safety executive.

Federal regulations don't require those who work on planes to be certified. Certification is required only for those who supervise maintenance. While the vast majority of mechanics at major airlines are certified, about half of those who work at contract repair stations are not.

To become certified, U.S. airline mechanics typically receive about two years of schooling. They must pass a series of tests required by the FAA, including practical exams in which they must demonstrate competence working on planes or components.

A report issued this year by the Congressional General Accounting Office found that the FAA's training curriculum for mechanics "has not changed significantly in over 50 years." That has left mechanics without the skills needed to work on today's technologically sophisticated planes, the report found.

Under federal regulations, pilots must be requalified regularly. But the rules don't specify how much training mechanics should receive after they're certified. Major airlines usually provide continuing training for mechanics, but in their push to save money, some have reduced it, mechanics say.

When times are tight, training is often "the first to go," says Finnegan, of the Professional Aviation Maintenance Association.

"Too much of what we do is treat maintenance as an expense to be minimized rather than an investment," he says.

Mechanics weren't properly trained to inspect blades. The crash of Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 529 shows how crucial training can be.

On Aug. 21, 1995, shortly before 1 p.m., the Embraer 120 turboprop was carrying 29 people from Atlanta to the Mississippi coast when a propeller blade snapped in two. For more than nine minutes, pilots struggled for control, but the crippled plane slammed into a Georgia hayfield. Ten people ultimately died from injuries suffered in the fiery crash.

Crash investigators said workers at a Hamilton Standard plant in Rock Hill had failed to detect corrosion that likely caused the blade to snap.

Chris Bender was one of the mechanics who inspected and repaired propeller blades. Like many of his fellow technicians, Bender came to the Hamilton Standard plant in 1994 from the automobile industry.

He says he took the job seriously.

"I always tried to envision people being on the planes I was working on," he said. "What if my dad is on the plane? I always tried to keep it personal. I felt if I did that, my quality would be better."

At the time, Hamilton Standard was trying to address a problem. Two of the company's propeller blades had previously failed in flight, so the FAA and Hamilton Standard came up with procedures for inspecting blades to ensure they were safe.

When ultrasonic tests showed that blades had potential problems, many of them were shipped to Hamilton Standard and came to Bender, who used a special tool to inspect the interior for corrosion or cracks.

He remembers seeing news of the Atlantic Southeast crash. The next day, Bender remembers, the FAA called the plant.

A quality-control inspector at the shop instructed Bender, then 23, to go through boxes of paperwork and look for the serial number of the propeller blade that snapped on ASA Flight 529.

He found the serial number, then opened a packet and saw the initials: CSB.

Christopher Scott Bender.

He had inspected the blade.

"My heart sank," he remembers. "I was almost in tears."

That night, he says, he called his mother and told her, "Something really bad happened at work. Can you be praying for me?"

Two years later, the NTSB blamed Hamilton Standard, not Bender. The safety board found that Bender and his colleagues hadn't been properly trained and equipped to identify the corrosion that led to the blade's fracture. Hamilton Standard said the technicians followed company procedures, but acknowledged that some of those procedures were inadequate. Atlantic Southeast declined to comment.

Bender, now 32, lives in Fort Mill , S.C. , and works as a youth pastor. He still wonders whether he could have done something to catch the problem. He thinks better instructions and communication might have prevented the crash.

He says the company could have done more to show him what to look for in the propeller blades with potential problems. He had been doing that job for about a month when he first examined the propeller blade that later went on the Atlantic Southeast plane. No one had ever shown him a crack in a propeller blade, he said.

"The method we were using was very primitive compared to what we needed to be using," Bender now says. "Looking back on it, you think, 'Why wouldn't we have a better way?' "

By Ames Alexander and Ted Reed